Detecting DOGE Big Balls ransomware with Wazuh

The DOGE Big Balls is a sophisticated ransomware variant linked to the Fog ransomware group, first observed in early 2025. It has affected organizations across various sectors, such as technology, education, and finance, by combining technical exploits with psychological manipulation. Delivered primarily through phishing campaigns containing malicious ZIP archives, the ransomware uses PowerShell scripts to download and execute payloads while exploiting vulnerable drivers for privilege escalation. Its attacks can cause severe operational disruptions, financial losses, and reputational damage.
In recent months, there has been a surge in DOGE Big Balls ransomware incidents, particularly targeting Windows-based environments. In addition to encrypting files and demanding ransom payments, the ransomware spreads fear and confusion through provocative ransom notes and data leak threats. In this blog post, we demonstrate how to detect DOGE Big Balls ransomware using Wazuh.
The ransomware is delivered through phishing emails containing malicious ZIP archives that execute PowerShell scripts when opened. After execution, DOGE Big Balls ransomware exhibits the following behavior:
iqvw64e.sys
, to gain kernel-level access without triggering security alerts. Notably, this driver is associated with CVE-2015-2291, a known vulnerability that allows attackers to bypass security controls and execute arbitrary code at the kernel level.systeminfo
, net config Workstation
, ipconfig /all
, and whoami
. The output of these commands is written to a log file named DbgLog.sys
, which is stored locally in the C:\Users\<USER_NAME>\Downloads
directory, where the DOGE Big Balls ransomware was executed before potential exfiltration. This behavior allows the attackers to profile the victim’s environment and assess the value of the compromised system.C:\Windows
and C:\PerfLogs
.RANSOMNOTE.txt
in affected directories, often containing provocative or misleading content.Type | Value |
SHA256 | 44b7eebf7a26d466f9c7ad4ddb058503f7066aded180ab6d5162197c47780293 4ad9216a0a6ac84a7b0b5593b0fc97e27de9cdfeb84ab7e5339ae5a4102100c0 30a6688899c22a3ce4c1b977fae762e3f7342d776e1aa2c90835e785d42f60c1 |
We use the following infrastructure to demonstrate the detection of DOGE Big Balls ransomware with Wazuh:
We monitor system events on the Windows endpoint using Sysmon and create custom rules on the Wazuh server to detect the malicious behavior of DOGE Big Balls ransomware.
Follow the steps below to configure Sysmon on the monitored endpoint and forward logs in the Sysmon event channel to the Wazuh server for analysis.
<SYSMON_EXECUTABLE_PATH>
with the path to your Sysmon executable.> wget -Uri https://wazuh.com/resources/blog/emulation-of-attack-techniques-and-detection-with-wazuh/sysmonconfig.xml -OutFile <SYSMON_EXECUTABLE_PATH>\sysmonconfig.xml
> .\Sysmon64.exe -accepteula -i sysmonconfig.xml
<ossec_config>
block of the C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\ossec.conf
file to forward Sysmon events to the Wazuh server:<localfile> <location>Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational</location> <log_format>eventchannel</log_format> </localfile>
6. Restart the Wazuh agent to apply the changes:
> Restart-Service -Name wazuh
In this section, we create rules to detect the activities of the DOGE Big Balls ransomware on the monitored Windows endpoint.
dog-big-balls-ransomware
of known DOGE Big Balls reconnaissance commands and save it to the /var/ossec/etc/lists
directory on the Wazuh server.# touch /var/ossec/etc/lists/doge-big-balls-ransomware
net config Workstation: systeminfo: hostname: net users: ipconfig /all: route print: arp -A: netstat -ano: netsh firewall show state: netsh firewall show config: schtasks /query /fo LIST /v: tasklist /SVC: net start: DRIVERQUERY:
/var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf
. You can do this by specifying the path to the list within the <ruleset>
block:... <ruleset> <list>etc/lists/doge-big-balls-ransomware</list> <ruleset> ...
doge_big_balls_ransomware_rules.xml
in the /var/ossec/etc/rules/
directory:# touch /var/ossec/etc/rules/doge_big_balls_ransomware_rules.xml
/var/ossec/etc/rules/doge_big_balls_ransomware_rules.xml
file:<group name="doge_big_ball,ransomware,"> <rule id="100020" level="10"> <if_sid>61613</if_sid> <field name="win.eventdata.image" type="pcre2">(?i)[C-Z]:.*\\\\.*.exe</field> <field name="win.eventdata.targetFilename" type="pcre2">(?i)[C-Z]:.*.\\\\DbgLog.sys</field> <description>A log file $(win.eventdata.targetFilename) was created to log the output of the reconnaissance activities of the DOGE Big Balls ransomware. Suspicious activity detected.</description> <mitre> <id>T1486</id> </mitre> </rule> <rule id="100021" level="8" timeframe="300" frequency="2"> <if_sid>61603</if_sid> <list field="win.eventdata.commandLine" lookup="match_key">etc/lists/doge-big-balls-ransomware</list> <description>The command $(win.eventdata.commandLine) is executed for reconnaissance activities. Suspicious activity detected.</description> <options>no_full_log</options> </rule> <!-- Ransom note file creation --> <rule id="100022" level="15" timeframe="300" frequency="2"> <if_sid>61613</if_sid> <field name="win.eventdata.image" type="pcre2">(?i)[C-Z]:.*\\\\.*.exe</field> <field name="win.eventdata.targetFilename" type="pcre2">(?i)[C-Z]:.*.\\\\readme.txt</field> <description>DOGE Big Balls ransom note $(win.eventdata.targetFilename) has been created in multiple directories. Possible DOGE Big Balls ransomware detected.</description> <mitre> <id>T1486</id> </mitre> </rule> <rule id="100023" level="15" timeframe="300" frequency="2" ignore="100"> <if_matched_sid>100020</if_matched_sid> <if_sid>100021</if_sid> <description>Possible DOGE Big Balls ransomware detected.</description> <mitre> <id>T1486</id> </mitre> </rule> </group>
Where:
100020
is triggered when the ransomware starts gathering the victim’s system information by executing a series of reconnaissance commands. The output of these commands is written to the C:\Users\<USER_NAME>\Downloads\DbgLog.sys file
.100021
is triggered when the ransomware executes several reconnaissance commands to gather the victim’s system information.100022
is triggered when multiple readme.txt
ransom notes are created in multiple directories. 100023
is triggered when rule IDs 100020
and 100021
are triggered within 300
seconds.# systemctl restart wazuh-manager
Follow the steps below to view the alerts generated on the Wazuh dashboard when the DOGE Big Balls ransomware is executed on the Windows endpoint.
1. Navigate to Threat intelligence > Threat Hunting.
2. Click + Add filter. Then filter by rule.id
.
3. In the Operator field, select is one of
.
4. Search and select 100020
, 100021
, 100022
, and 100023
in the Values field.
5. Click Save.
Ransomware renders infected endpoints unusable, making recovery difficult and time-consuming. A proactive defense involves detecting and removing malicious files before they are executed. We recommend enabling pre-execution protection using the Wazuh File Integrity Module (FIM) with VirusTotal or YARA integration. This approach matches the hash of downloaded files against threat intelligence databases and triggers a Wazuh Active Response script to remove malicious files before execution.
In this section, we illustrate how to detect and remove malicious files by leveraging Wazuh integration with YARA. We configure the Wazuh FIM module to track file modification or addition in a specific directory. When a change is detected in the monitored directory, the Wazuh Active Response module initiates a YARA scan, which detects potentially malicious files based on predefined rules.
Perform the steps below to set up the monitored endpoint for this integration.
pip
pre-installed). Make sure to check the box Add python.exe to PATH, which places the Python interpreter in the execution path.> Invoke-WebRequest -Uri https://github.com/VirusTotal/yara/releases/download/v4.5.2/yara-v4.5.2-2326-win64.zip -OutFile v4.5.2-2326-win64.zip
> Expand-Archive v4.5.2-2326-win64.zip
yara
folder in the C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\
folder and copy the YARA binary into it:> mkdir 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\' > cp .\v4.5.2-2326-win64\yara64.exe 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\'
pip
utility to install valhallaAPI
. This API retrieves the public signature-based YARA ruleset:> pip install valhallaAPI
file download_yara_rules.py
, with the below script:@' from valhallaAPI.valhalla import ValhallaAPI v = ValhallaAPI(api_key="1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111") response = v.get_rules_text() with open('yara_rules.yar', 'w') as fh: fh.write(response) '@ | Set-Content -Path ".\download_yara_rules.py"
download_yara_rules.py
script file to download YARA rules: > python download_yara_rules.py
C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara
folder and copy the rules into it:> mkdir 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\rules\' > cp yara_rules.yar 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\rules\'
C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\rules\yara_rules.yar
and add the following DOGE Big Balls ransomware rule:rule _DOGE_Big_Balls_Ransomware { meta: description = "DOGE Big Balls ransomware executable detection" author = "Anthony Faruna" reference = "https://github.com/Neo23x0/yarGen" date = "2025-05-19" strings: $s1 = "Failed to open file. ShellExecute error: %d" fullword ascii $s2 = "AppPolicyGetProcessTerminationMethod" fullword ascii $s3 = "\\RANSOMNOTE.txt" fullword ascii $s4 = "Failed to get Desktop path." fullword ascii $s5 = "%s\\Desktop\\RANSOMNOTE.txt" fullword ascii $s6 = "Open RANSOMNOTE.txt?" fullword ascii $s7 = " Type Descriptor'" fullword ascii $s8 = "operator co_await" fullword ascii $s9 = "User clicked OK." fullword ascii $s10 = "api-ms-win-appmodel-runtime-l1-1-2" fullword wide $s11 = "User clicked Cancel or closed the MessageBox." fullword ascii $s12 = " Class Hierarchy Descriptor'" fullword ascii $s13 = " Base Class Descriptor at (" fullword ascii $s14 = "COM256" fullword ascii $s15 = "F9]%c%" fullword ascii $s16 = " Complete Object Locator'" fullword ascii $s17 = "\"^4]%* " fullword ascii $s18 = "(- d|X" fullword ascii $s19 = "USERPROFILE" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 154 times */ $s20 = "network down" fullword ascii /* Goodware String - occured 567 times */ condition: ( uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 1000KB and ( 8 of them ) ) or ( all of them ) }
Downloads
folder of all users in real-time by adding the below configuration within the <syscheck>
block of the C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\ossec.conf
file:<directories realtime="yes">C:\Users\*\Downloads</directories>
Note
In this blog post, we only monitored the Downloads
folder of all users. However, you can configure other folders you wish to monitor.
yara.bat
in the C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\
folder and copy the below script into it. The Wazuh Active Response module runs this script to perform YARA scans for malware detection and removal::: This script deletes the DOGE Big Balls ransomware executable as well as other malicious files matched by the YARA Rules @echo off setlocal enableDelayedExpansion reg Query "HKLM\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0" | find /i "x86" > NUL && SET OS=32BIT || SET OS=64BIT if %OS%==32BIT ( SET log_file_path="%programfiles%\ossec-agent\active-response\active-responses.log" ) if %OS%==64BIT ( SET log_file_path="%programfiles(x86)%\ossec-agent\active-response\active-responses.log" ) set input= for /f "delims=" %%a in ('PowerShell -command "$logInput = Read-Host; Write-Output $logInput"') do ( set input=%%a ) set json_file_path="C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\stdin.txt" set syscheck_file_path= echo %input% > %json_file_path% FOR /F "tokens=* USEBACKQ" %%F IN (`Powershell -Nop -C "(Get-Content 'C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\stdin.txt'|ConvertFrom-Json).parameters.alert.syscheck.path"`) DO ( SET syscheck_file_path=%%F ) set yara_exe_path="C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\yara64.exe" set yara_rules_path="C:\Program Files (x86)\ossec-agent\active-response\bin\yara\rules\yara_rules.yar" echo %syscheck_file_path% >> %log_file_path% for /f "delims=" %%a in ('powershell -command "& \"%yara_exe_path%\" \"%yara_rules_path%\" \"%syscheck_file_path%\""') do ( echo wazuh-yara: INFO - Scan result: %%a >> %log_file_path% :: Deleting the scanned file. del /f "%syscheck_file_path%" >nul 2>&1 if exist "%syscheck_file_path%" ( echo wazuh-yara: INFO - Error removing threat: %%a >> %log_file_path% ) else ( echo wazuh-yara: INFO - Successfully deleted: %%a >> %log_file_path% ) ) exit /b
> Restart-Service -Name wazuh
We configure rules, custom decoders, and the Wazuh Active Response module to capture alerts related to the addition and removal of the ransomware sample.
/var/ossec/etc/rules/local_rules.xml
file. These rules trigger alerts when files are added or modified in the Downloads
folder on the monitored endpoint.<group name="syscheck,"> <rule id="100024" level="7"> <if_sid>550</if_sid> <field name="file" type="pcre2">(?i)C:\\Users.+Downloads</field> <description>File modified in the Downloads folder.</description> </rule> <rule id="100025" level="7"> <if_sid>554</if_sid> <field name="file" type="pcre2">(?i)C:\\Users.+Downloads</field> <description>File added to the Downloads folder.</description> </rule> </group>
Where:
100024
is triggered when a file is modified in the Downloads
folder.100025
is triggered when a file is added to the Downloads
folder.<ossec_config>
block of the /var/ossec/etc/ossec.conf
file:<command> <name>yara</name> <executable>yara.bat</executable> <timeout_allowed>no</timeout_allowed> </command> <active-response> <command>yara</command> <location>local</location> <rules_id>100024,100025</rules_id> </active-response>
The Wazuh Active Response module runs the yara.bat
script when a file is added or modified in the Downloads
folder.
Where:
<name>
specifies that yara
is the name of the command being called in the <active-response>
block.<executable>
specifies that yara.bat
is the executable file to run.<command>
specifies the command that the Active Response module will use.<active response>
block calls the <command>
block when the rule ID 100024
or 100025
is triggered.<location>
specifies where the Active Response script is executed./var/ossec/etc/decoders/local_decoder.xml
file to decode the logs generated by the Active Response script:<decoder name="yara_decoder"> <prematch>wazuh-yara:</prematch> </decoder> <decoder name="yara_decoder1"> <parent>yara_decoder</parent> <regex>wazuh-yara: (\S+) - Scan result: (\S+) (\S+)</regex> <order>log_type, yara_rule, yara_scanned_file</order> </decoder> <decoder name="yara_decoder1"> <parent>yara_decoder</parent> <regex>wazuh-yara: (\S+) - Successfully deleted: (\S+) (\S+)</regex> <order>log_type, yara_rule, yara_scanned_file</order> </decoder> <decoder name="yara_decoder1"> <parent>yara_decoder</parent> <regex>wazuh-yara: (\S+) - Error removing threat: (\S+) (\S+)</regex> <order>log_type, yara_rule, yara_scanned_file</order> </decoder>
/var/ossec/etc/rules/local_rules.xml
to generate alerts when response actions are taken:<!-- Rule for the decoder (yara_decoder) --> <group name="yara,"> <rule id="100026" level="0"> <decoded_as>yara_decoder</decoded_as> <description>Yara grouping rule</description> </rule> <!-- YARA scan detects a positive match --> <rule id="100027" level="12"> <if_sid>100026</if_sid> <match type="pcre2">wazuh-yara: INFO - Scan result: </match> <description>File "$(yara_scanned_file)" is a ransomware. Yara rule: $(yara_rule)</description> </rule> <!-- Wazuh successfully deletes malware with a positive match --> <rule id="100028" level="12"> <if_sid>100026</if_sid> <match type="pcre2">wazuh-yara: INFO - Successfully deleted: </match> <description>Successfully removed "$(yara_scanned_file)" by active response due to YARA rule $(yara_rule) positive match</description> </rule> <!-- Wazuh encounters an error when deleting malware with a positive match --> <rule id="100029" level="12"> <if_sid>100026</if_sid> <match type="pcre2">wazuh-yara: INFO - Error removing threat: </match> <description>Error removing "$(yara_scanned_file)". YARA rule: $(yara_rule)</description> </rule> </group>
Where:
100026
is the base rule for detecting YARA related events.100027
is triggered when YARA scans and detects the DOGE Big Balls ransomware executable.100028
is triggered when the executable has been successfully removed by the Wazuh Active Response module.100029
is triggered when the executable is not removed successfully by the Wazuh Active Response module.# systemctl restart wazuh-manager
When the DOGE Big Balls ransomware executable is added to the Downloads
folder of the victim endpoint and removed by the Active Response module, alerts are generated on the Wazuh dashboard.
To view these alerts:
rule.id
.is one of
.100025
, 100027
, and 100028
in the Values field.This blog post shows how to detect DOGE Big Balls ransomware on a Windows endpoint using Wazuh. We leverage the Wazuh data analysis engine to create rules that identify the malicious activities associated with the ransomware. Also, we demonstrate how to use the Wazuh FIM and Active Response capabilities with YARA integration to respond to threats.
Wazuh is a free and open source security solution that provides a wide range of capabilities to monitor and protect your infrastructure against various threats. If you have questions about this blog post or need assistance with Wazuh, we encourage you to join our Slack community, where our team is ready to support you.